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Abstract: Recent empirical evidence suggests that Chinese development finance may be 
particularly prone to elite capture and patronage spending. If aid ends up in the pockets of political 
elites and their ethno-regional networks, this may exacerbate grievances based in horizontal 
inequalities. Against this background, the present study investigates whether the implementation of 
Chinese development projects fuels local ethnic identities. A new geo-referenced dataset on the 
subnational allocation of Chinese development finance projects to Africa over the 2000-2014 period 
is geographically matched with survey data for 94,954 respondents from 18 African countries. The 
identification strategy consists in comparing sites where a Chinese project was under 
implementation at the time of the interview, to sites where a Chinese project will appear 
subsequently but where implementation had not yet started at the time of the survey. While 
suggesting substantial country variation, the empirical results indeed suggest that, on average, living 
near an ongoing Chinese project fuels ethnic identification. I consider two mechanisms possibly 
underlying this result. First, competition for the inflow of resources that aid constitutes could 
mobilize ethnic identities across the board. Second, perceptions of ethnically biased aid may fuel 
ethnic identities in groups perceiving themselves as disadvantaged. Two observations speak in 
favour of the latter mechanism. First, the estimated effect is not uniform across groups, but driven 
by people belonging to the out-group. Second, there is no indication of an equivalent pattern when 
considering development projects of other donors. Replicating the key analysis for World Bank 
projects as well as for other bilateral donors, the results in fact indicate the reverse, i.e. that living 
near an ongoing as opposed to a future project comes with weaker ethnic identification. 
 
JEL classification: F35, O19, O55 
Keywords: China, aid, ethnic identities, Africa 
 
 1 Introduction 
 
In 2010 China's foreign minister visited Yoni, a small village in Sierra Leone, with a grand 
school-building plan. While Sierra Leone could certainly use more schools, “some wondered 
why the Chinese chose the middle of the bush for the project” (The Economist, 2017). As it 
turns out, Yoni is the home village of Ernest Bai Koroma, Sierra Leone's president at the time. 
By a similar coincidence, of the three primary schools constructed with Chinese funds in rural 
Tanzania, one was built in the then President Jakaya Kikwete’s hometown of Msoga (Hodzi, 
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2017). Around the same time, in Namibia, Chinese scholarships went to children of top 
ministers and public officials, reigniting a debate that China uses its development finance “to 
create elite alliances and ease the approval of no-bid contracts” (The New York Times, 2009). 
These are not isolated incidents; the emergence of China as a key development partner in Africa 
has been the subject of much controversy (see e.g. the discussion in Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et 
al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Penhelt, 2007; Bräutigam, 2009; Marantidou and Glosserman, 2015), 
not least for the alleged tendency of funds to end up in the pockets of political elites. Indeed, 
recent empirical evidence back up the anecdotal reports, suggesting that Chinese aid may be 
particularly easy to exploit for politicians who are engaged in patronage politics (Dreher et al., 
2016).  
 In the African context, where patronage politics is commonly suggested to have an ethnic 
dimension (see e.g. Lemarchand, 1972; Wantchekon, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008), this 
raises questions regarding potentially important externalities of aid. In particular, if 
development finance ends up in the pockets of political elites and their ethno-regional 
networks, does this exacerbate ethnic grievances and contribute to ethnic mobilization? Against 
this background, the present study investigates whether Chinese development projects fuel 
local ethnic identities in African partner countries. 
 Until recently, studying the motivations behind and effects of Chinese development 
finance has been very difficult since the Chinese government, unlike the OECD-DAC donors, 
does not routinely publish information on its foreign assistance. However, with a new 
comprehensive dataset on Chinese Official Finance to Africa issued by the AidData research 
laboratory (Bluhm et al., 2018), systematic quantitative analysis of Chinese aid flows is now 
possible. Using this data, Dreher et al. (2016) find that Chinese development finance is 
disproportionately allocated to the birth regions of African leaders and, less clearly so, to areas 
populated by individuals who share their ethnicity. Replicating their analysis for World Bank 
aid, they find no evidence of corresponding regional or ethnic favoritism.  
 Two mechanisms through which Chinese development projects may make ethnic identities 
more salient are considered. First, in line with findings suggesting that ethnic identities are 
mobilized by political competition in the pursuit of resources (Eifert et al., 2010), competition 
for the inflow of resources that aid constitutes could mobilize ethnic identities across the board. 
Second, considering the recent evidence suggesting that Chinese development finance is 
particularly prone to elite capture and possible ethnic bias (Dreher et al., 2016), perceptions of 
ethnically biased aid may fuel ethnic identities in groups perceiving themselves as 
disadvantaged. 
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 Due to the likelihood of feeding into horizontal inequalities, ethnically biased aid is 
problematic. Horizontal inequalities – or inequalities between groups defined culturally, e.g. in 
terms of ethnic, religious or regional identity – matter both for individual well-being and 
instrumentally, for economic efficiency and social stability (Stewart et al., 2005). If 
membership of a group is part of a person’s identity (see e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), their 
well-being will not only depend on individual circumstances, but also on how well their group 
is doing. Instrumentally, group inequalities may give rise to grievances that stimulate social 
unrest and conflict that undermine development efforts.  
 The concern that aid may exacerbate group inequalities, either because the donor’s aid 
allocation decisions in themselves lead to a distribution of resources that worsens these 
inequalities or because elite capture of aid during the implementation phase has a similar effect 
(Brown et al., 2010), is not unique to Chinese aid. Indeed, empirical studies on sub-national 
aid allocation patterns of other donors often point to insufficient targeting of poor areas (see 
e.g. Powell and Findley, 2012; Öhler and Nunnenkamp, 2014; Briggs, 2017) as well as elite 
capture of aid (se e.g. Briggs, 2014; Jablonski, 2014; Dreher et al., 2016).  
 However, a number of commonly suggested features of Chinese development finance 
make it particularly relevant to study in this context. To begin with, the demand-driven nature 
of the Chinese aid allocation process (Brautigam, 2011; Dreher et al., 2016) and China’s policy 
of non-interference in the domestic affairs of partner countries (State Council, 2014) arguably 
make it prone to elite capture and possible ethnic bias. Furthermore, rather than broad-based 
development projects established in country poverty reduction strategies, it is often suggested 
that China tends to finance highly visible prestige projects benefiting a select few (see e.g. Tull, 
2006). Citizens in the local area are thus likely to observe the concerned development project 
being implemented without necessarily getting a share of the rewards, which may lead to 
perceptions of unfair treatment. 
 The study asks whether the implementation of Chinese development projects fuels ethnic 
identities near project sites, whether the effect is uniform across groups, and whether China 
stands out from other donors in this respect. To this end, a new geo-referenced dataset on the 
subnational allocation of Chinese development finance projects to Africa over the 2000-2014 
period is geographically matched with 94,954 respondents from three Afrobarometer survey 
waves across 18 African countries. The estimation strategy to account for the endogenous 
placement of Chinese project sites consists in comparing the estimated effect of living near a 
site where a Chinese project was under implementation at the time of the interview, to that of 
living near a site where we know a Chinese project will appear subsequently.  
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 The empirical results indeed suggest that living near an ongoing Chinese project fuels 
ethnic identities. The effect is not uniform though, but driven by people who belong to the out-
group. The fact that the effect is only present among non-coethnics of the country president 
may signal that it is driven by ethnic grievances originating in perceived ethnic bias rather than 
ethnic competition for resources more generally. Furthermore, a comparison across donors 
reveals that Chinese development projects stand out from those of other influential donors in 
terms of fueling ethnic identities. If ethnic identities were mobilized by competition for the 
inflow of aid funds more broadly, one would expect the hypothesized pattern observed for 
China to be similar across donors. Hence, this too seemingly speaks against the general ethnic 
competition mechanism.   
 Replicating the key analysis for World Bank projects as well as for other bilateral donors 
the results in fact indicate the reverse, i.e. that living near an ongoing as opposed to a future 
project comes with weaker ethnic identification. Moreover, this effect is uniform across in- and 
out-group, thus providing no indication of differential experiences across ethnic groups. This 
suggestive finding opens for interesting future research: can aid projects, if implemented in an 
ethnically neutral fashion, in effect act to bring people together, across ethnic group lines? 
 Being the first effort to systemically investigate the effects of development projects on 
local ethnic identities in African partner countries, the study makes two principal contributions. 
First, it contributes directly to the literature on ethnic mobilization in Africa (e.g. Posner, 2003; 
Posner, 2004; Eifert et al., 2010). Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010) find that the degree of 
ethnic identification in Africa varies considerably over time and is influenced by political 
competition. The present study brings this thinking to the aid literature, where a similar 
argument can be made for ethnic identities reacting to the infusion of donor funds. As such, it 
also adds to a broader literature on ethnic politics in Africa (see e.g. Lemarchand, 1972; 
Wantchekon, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Franck and Rainer; 2012; Hodler and 
Rachky, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015; Ahlerup and Isaksson, 2015; Kramon and Posner, 2016; 
Isaksson and Bigsten, 2017).  
 Second, it contributes to the emerging literature evaluating the sub-national allocation and 
impacts of aid (e.g. Francken et al., 2012; Nunnenkamp et al., 2012; Powell and Findley, 2012; 
Briggs, 2014; Jablonski, 2014; Öhler and Nunnenkamp, 2014; Berlin et al., 2017; Briggs, 
2017). In particular, it adds to the recent strand of this literature focusing on the allocation and 
local externalities of Chinese aid (Dreher et al., 2016; Brazys et al., 2017; Bluhm et al., 2018; 
Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018a,b). As noted by Bluhm et al. (2018) an important question that 
remains unanswered in this strand of literature is whether and to what extent Chinese 
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development projects widen or narrow inequalities in poor countries. Bluhm and co-authors 
find that Chinese development projects in general, and Chinese transportation projects in 
particular, reduce spatial inequality measured in terms of night time light. They do not, 
however, consider inequalities across ethnic groups. 
   
 2 Chinese aid and ethnic identities: Mechanisms 
 
The idea that Chinese development projects may fuel local ethnic identities rests on a 
constructivist account of ethnicity, according to which ethnic identities are mobilized in the 
pursuit of state resources as opposed to being primordial and hardwired (see e.g. Posner, 2003; 
Posner, 2004; Kasara, 2007; Eifert et al., 2010).1 Against this background, the study considers 
two (non-mutually exclusive) channels through which aid projects may fuel local ethnic 
identities.  
 First, competition for the inflow of resources that aid constitutes could mobilize ethnic 
identities across the board. The results of Eifert et al. (2010), mentioned above, speak in favour 
of such a mechanism. In particular, drawing on survey data across 10 African countries their 
findings suggest that ethnic cleavages are more salient at election times and in cases where the 
winning party won by a small margin. They interpret this as supporting an instrumental 
understanding of ethnicity, where ethnic identities are mobilized in the struggle for political 
power and economic resources. By this reasoning, the inflow of resources could fuel ethnic 
identities even in the absence of ethnic bias, simply by raising the stakes in the struggle for 
resources. 
 A second possible mechanism, however, is that perceived ethnic bias in the delivery of aid 
fuels ethnic grievances and identities in groups that perceive themselves as disadvantaged. The 
idea that unequal treatment of ethnic groups raise group members’ ethnic awareness is in line 
with a ‘reactive ethnicity’ approach, according to which ethnic mobilization is prompted by an 
unequal division of resources along ethnic lines (Vermeersch, 2011). Studies in psychology 
and sociology have shown that systematic discrimination of ethnic minorities may result in 
                                                        
1 There is also experimental evidence to this effect. Public goods games in Uganda demonstrate that the possibility 
of social sanctions influence whether individuals treat coethnics differently than members of other groups. In 
particular,  co-ethnics are only more likely to favour each other if they are seen to do so, and thus risk that non-
cooperative behavuiour is met with future sanctions (Habyarimana et al., 2007, 2009).  
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increased ethnic identification among the minorities' group members (see the discussion in 
Çelik, 2015). Considering the recent empirical evidence that Chinese development finance is 
particularly prone to elite capture and possible ethnic bias (Dreher et al., 2016), the discussion 
below will focus on potential sources of ethnic bias in the (Chinese) aid delivery process.  
  
 2.1 Three levels of potential ethnic bias in the aid delivery process 
 
Ethnic bias could take place at different levels and take different forms depending on the type 
and targeting of the projects. In particular, it is useful to make a distinction between ethnic bias 
in 1) geographic allocation, 2) local implementation and 3) local rewards. Ethnic bias in 
geographic allocation implies that development projects (for whatever reason) tend to be 
located in areas disproportionately populated by particular ethnic groups. Ethnic bias in local 
implementation, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the local implementation process 
of development projects – e.g. in terms of staffing and contracts awarded – systematically 
benefits some particular group. Ethnic bias in local rewards, finally, refers to ethnic bias in the 
local distribution of the end product of the project.  
 Consider a development project focusing on building schools. Ethnic bias in geographic 
allocation would imply that the schools are built in areas disproportionately populated by a 
specific ethnic group. Ethnic bias in local implementation of the school project could for 
instance refer to a situation where building contracts awarded and teachers hired systematically 
benefit a particular group in the local areas. Ethnic bias in local rewards, finally, would in this 
particular example refer to kids from a particular group getting preferential access to the 
schools. Of course, the bias may well operate on more than one level.  
 Figure 1 illustrates the variety of forms the bias could take depending on which level(s) it 
operates. For instance, even if there is no ethnic bias in the geographic allocation stage – i.e. 
Chinese projects do not systematically favour regions disproportionately populated by a 
particular ethnic group – there may well be ethnic bias in the local implementation and 
distribution of rewards. Indeed, if there is ethnic bias in the local government and they are 
given substantial discretion during the implementation phase of the project, this seems likely.  
 The third stage – the local distribution of rewards – is closely related to the degree of 
excludability of the end product, which has implications for how narrowly the good can be 
targeted, and to what extent benefits are likely to spill over to different groups (see the 
reasoning in Isaksson and Bigsten, 2017). If the development project involves the distribution 
of public goods, then even if there is ethnic bias in geographic allocation, benefits are still 
7  
likely to spill over to other groups. If, on the other hand, the rewards from a development 
project consist in narrowly targeted private (i.e. excludable) goods, then with ethnic bias in 
local rewards, benefits need not spill over to other groups. Rather, the patronage network may 
in effect be narrower than the ethnic group, meaning that many co-ethnics of the politician in 
power are still excluded from the rewards (Kasara, 2007).  
 
 2.2 Chinese development finance and risk of ethnic bias 
 
Two related features of Chinese development finance give partner country governments 
considerable discretion in the distribution of funds, thereby arguably making it prone to elite 
capture and possible ethnic bias in geographic allocation and local implementation and 
distribution of rewards. First, China has an explicit policy of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of recipients (State Council, 2014). While recipient country governments tend to see the 
principle as a sign of China respecting their countries’ sovereignty, critics view it as a 
convenient rationale for economic involvement in undemocratic and corrupt regimes and 
suggest that it makes Chinese aid easy to exploit for politicians (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky 
et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Pehnelt, 2007; Marantidou and Glosserman, 2015).  
 Second, and related, the demand-driven nature of the Chinese aid allocation process (see 
e.g. Brautigam, 2011) arguably gives the domestic authorities in partner countries leeway to 
allocate funds to activities and locations that best suit their own interests. As described in detail 
in Dreher et al. (2016), China’s aid allocation tends to be based on requests from recipient-
country governments. Their aid packages and projects are often negotiated in high-level 
meetings with political leaders rather than publicly outlined in country development assistance 
strategies, with the initiative generally coming from the recipient side. Interpreted favorably, 
this could again be seen as a sign of ensuring partner country ownership of development policy. 
And importantly, African leaders may use the discretion in the distribution of Chinese funds to 
address key development challenges that have not attracted sufficient funding from Western 
donors. At the same time, however, a request-based system of aid project delivery may provide 
opportunities for recipient country governments to use funds strategically by promoting a 
subnational distribution of funds that favors their patronage network. As noted, there is both 
anecdotal reports and systematic empirical evidence (Dreher et al., 2016) suggesting that 
political leaders have used Chinese aid for political advantage or self-enrichment.  
 Furthermore, what should matter for agents’ attitudes and behaviour is perceived rather 
than de-facto ethnic bias in aid delivery (see the discussion in Isaksson, 2011). Irrespective of 
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de-facto ethnic bias, citizens may perceive their group as being disadvantaged and mobilize 
ethnic identities accordingly. Perceptions of ethnic bias should depend on to what extent the 
project is visible – meaning that local citizens are aware of its existence – and the degree to 
which it is interpreted as inclusive, i.e. as benefiting the general population rather than a select 
few, and ethnically neutral. Chinese development projects arguably stand out from the projects 
of Western donors on both accounts. Several scholars suggest that China tends to finance 
symbolic infrastructure projects and prestigious buildings such as presidential palaces, sports 
stadiums, government buildings and conference centers rather than more broad-based 
interventions (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Brautigam 2011a, Strange et al 2013). 
  
 2.3 Empirical implications 
 
Against this background, it is interesting to study whether Chinese development projects fuel 
local ethnic identities, and whether the potential effect varies depending on whether the 
respondents belong to an in-group – proxied by being a co-ethnic with the country president at 
the time of the survey – or an out-group. 
 The existence (or lack) of parameter heterogeneity arguably sheds light on the theoretical 
mechanisms involved. If there is an effect, and it is uniform across groups, this would seem to 
imply that it is competition for the inflow of resources in and of itself, rather than perceptions 
of ethnic bias in the distribution of these resources, that mobilize ethnic identities. If the effect 
is significantly stronger in the out-group, on the other hand, this arguably signals that the effect 
is driven by ethnic grievances originating in perceived ethnic bias in disadvantaged groups. 
 Provided that ethnic bias in aid allocation and implementation is not a universal 
phenomenon existing across all donors, comparing the results for Chinese development 
projects with those obtained when considering the projects of other influential donors could 
also be revealing in this regard. If the hypothesized effect is observed for all donors, this too 
would arguably add support to the idea that it is competition for the inflow of resources more 
generally, rather than perceived ethnic bias in the distribution of these resources, that mobilize 
ethnic identities. The next section elaborates on how to address the research questions 
empirically. 
 
 3 Data and empirical strategy 
 
9  
To explore the local effects of Chinese development projects on ethnic identities in Africa, I 
geographically match spatial data on China’s official financial flows to the continent over the 
period 2000-2014 with 94,954 respondents from 18 African countries2 obtained from rounds 
3-6 of the Afrobarometer survey.  
 The data on Chinese aid projects is obtained from geo-referenced project-level data of 
AidData’s Geocoded Global Chinese Official Finance Version 1.1.1 dataset (Bluhm et al., 
2018). Since the Chinese government does not release official, project-level financial 
information about its foreign aid activities, this data is based on an open-source media based 
data collection technique, synthesizing and standardizing a large amount of information on 
Chinese development finance to African countries (described in detail in Strange et al., 2013 
and 2015). While information extracted from public media outlets is of course an imperfect 
substitute for complete statistical data from official sources, the authors provide a careful 
description of how they dealt with challenges in the data collection process.3 Furthermore, the 
only information used here is whether, where and when a project was implemented. That is, I 
do not make use of potentially sensitive and less reliable information on e.g. specific aid 
volumes or details from the implementation process. 
 The aid data contains latitude and longitude project co-ordinates, and provide information 
about the precision of the location identified (for details about the geocoding methodology 
used, see AidData Research and Evaluation Unit, 2017). While some development projects are 
implemented in a limited geographical area, such as a village or city, others are realized at more 
aggregate levels, such as a district or greater administrative region.  Hence, project locations 
are coded into different categories depending on the degree of precision of the specified 
location, ranging from category 1 for coordinates to an exact location, to 8 when the location 
is estimated to be a seat of an administrative division or the national capital (see Strandow et 
al. 2011).  Being interested in local effects of Chinese development projects, I focus on projects 
with recorded locations coded as corresponding to an exact location or as ‘near’, in the ‘area’ 
                                                        
2 The benchmark estimation sample is restricted to include the 18 Afrobarometer countries with observations 
connected to both ongoing and future Chinese development projects, i.e. the countries that have both a post- and 
a pre-treatment group of respondents (see Section 3.1). These are: Benin, Botswana, Botswana, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe. 
3 See also Muchapondwa et al., 2014, for a validation using a ‘ground-truthing’ methodology. 
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of, or up to 25 km away from an exact location (precision categories 1 and 2 in Strandow et al. 
2011). 
 The point coordinates in the aid data are used to link aid projects to local survey 
respondents in the Afrobarometer. The coordinates of the surveyed Afrobarometer clusters, 
consisting of one or several geographically close villages or a neighborhood in an urban area, 
are used to match individuals to aid project sites with precise point coordinates. As in Isaksson 
and Kotsadam (2018a and 2018b), I measure the distance from the cluster centre points to the 
aid project sites and identify the clusters located within a cut-off distance – here 25 km – of at 
least one project site. Figure 2 maps the Chinese projects with precise geocodes and start-dates 
across the African continent, along with the Afrobarometer survey clusters encircled by 25 km 
buffer zones. The 18 countries in the benchmark estimation sample contain 276 such project 
sites. The estimation strategy, described further below, will rely on identifying survey 
respondents within 25 km of project sites, i.e. in clusters where an ongoing or future Chinese 
project lies within the 25 km buffer zone. 
 The dependent variable focuses on ethnic identification. To capture the salience of ethnic 
identities, I use a question asking whether the respondent identifies primarily with his or her 
ethnic group or with his or her country, creating a dummy variable indicating if the respondent 
reports to identify more in ethnic than in national terms.4 In the overall estimation sample, 13 
percent of the respondents report to identify in ethnic terms (Table A1), the corresponding 
country shares ranging from around 4 percent in Tanzania and Cape Verde, to around 24 
percent in Mali (Figure A1). 
 The main explanatory variables, which will be described in greater detail below, focus on 
living near a Chinese project site – either a site where a project is being implemented at the 
time of the survey (Ongoing) or a site where a project will be opened but where implementation 
had not yet been initiated at the time of the survey (Future).  
 To explore whether the potential effect of living close to a Chinese project site varies 
depending on the status of one’s ethnic group, another key explanatory variable combines 
information on self-reported ethnic group affiliation 5  with external data on the ethnic                                                         
4 Based on the question “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [national ID] and being a 
[respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?” with the following response 
categories: 1=I feel only [Respondent’s ethnic group], 2=I feel more [Respondent’s ethnic group] than [national 
ID], 3=I feel equally [national ID] and [Respondent’s ethnic group],  4=I feel more [national ID] than 
[Respondent’s ethnic group] 5=I feel only [national ID], 7=Not applicable. 
5 Based on the question “What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?”. 
11  
affiliations of heads of government in office. More specifically, I construct a dummy variable 
indicating whether the respondent belongs to the same ethnic group as the country’s president 
at the time of the survey (In-group), and then interact this indicator with the variables for living 
close to Chinese project sites. Variable descriptions and summary statistics are presented in 
Tables A1-A2. 
 
 3.1 Estimation strategy 
 
The distribution of aid within countries is by no means random, implying that some individuals 
and sub-national areas, with certain characteristics, will be more likely than others to be 
targeted by aid. Members of the same ethnic group often live geographically clustered and a 
common argument is that African policy-makers tend to favour their own homelands and ethnic 
groups in the allocation of funds. Hence, some areas and ethnic groups – and thus a non-random 
group of individuals with particular ethnic identities and living conditions – will presumably 
be more likely to be targeted by aid than others. For this reason, it is not plausible to assume 
that there is no relationship between project localization and the pre-existing characteristics of 
project sites and of the population residing in the surrounding areas. The implication is that it 
is problematic to draw conclusions about the causal effect of aid on ethnic identities from a 
direct comparison of the ethnic identities of people living close to and far away from project 
sites. 
 In order to deal with these empirical challenges, I use a spatial-temporal estimation 
strategy resembling that in Knutsen et al. (2016).6 In particular, I compare the estimated effect 
of living near sites where a Chinese development project is currently under implementation 
with the estimated effect of living near sites where a project will be opened but where 
implementation had not yet been initiated at the time the Afrobarometer covered that particular 
area.  
 While the fact that the Afrobarometer is not a panel hinders me from following specific 
localities over time, before and after a project was initiated, with this estimation strategy I can 
still make use of the time variation in the data. Specifically, I utilize the fact that there is 
information about at what point in time and in what localities aid projects have been 
implemented, and that the survey data covers different localities at different points in time. 
This makes it possible to identify respondents living in areas where a project was ongoing at 
                                                        
6 See also Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018a and 2018b). 
12  
the time of the survey and compare them with respondents living in areas where, in hindsight, 
we know that a project will start, but where implementation had yet to begin at the time of the 
survey. 
 Assuming that ethnic identities are affected within a cut-off distance of Chinese projects, 
the main identification strategy includes three groups of individuals, namely 1) those within 25 
km of at least one ongoing project site (Ongoing, applying to 19 percent of respondents),  2) 
those within 25 km of a site where a project will start, but where implementation was yet to 
begin at the survey date and not close to any ongoing projects (Future, applying to 3 percent 
of respondents), and 3) those with more than 25 km from any project site (the omitted reference 
category in the regressions, applying to 78 percent of respondents).7 The baseline regression 
takes the form: 
  
 
where the ethnic identity Y for an individual i in cluster v at year t is regressed – in the 
benchmark setup using linear probability models – on a dummy variable Ongoing capturing 
whether the individual lives within the specified cut-off distance of an ongoing Chinese 
development project, and a dummy Future for living close to a site where a Chinese project is 
planned but not yet implemented at the time of the survey. To control for variation in average 
levels of ethnic identities across time and space, the regressions include country fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠) and year fixed effects (𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡). To control for individual variation in ethnic identities, a vector (𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖) of individual-level controls from the Afrobarometer are included. The baseline set of 
individual controls are age, age squared, gender and urban/rural residence. To account for 
correlated errors, the standard errors are clustered at the geographical clusters (i.e., at the 
enumeration areas which correspond to either a village, a town or a neighborhood). In another 
set of regressions I add an interaction term between Ongoing and the variable indicating 
whether the respondent belongs to the same ethnic group as the country’s president at the time 
of the survey (In-group). 
   Interpreting the coefficient on Ongoing (𝛽𝛽1) in isolation as capturing an effect of Chinese 
development projects on local ethnic identities would necessitate that the location of Chinese 
development projects is not correlated with pre-existing ethnic sentiments. As can be                                                         
7 I exclude respondents who live within the cut-off distance of a site where the implementation of a project has 
been completed prior to the interview date (4.6 percent of respondents, see Table A1). 
ivtittsititivt FutureOngoingY εγδαββ +⋅+++⋅+⋅= X21)1(
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understood from the above discussion, this assumption is not judged as reasonable.  Including 
Future enables me to compare sites with ongoing projects to other areas selected as locations 
for Chinese projects, but where the project was yet to be initiated at the time of the survey. My 
focus is thus on the parameter difference between Ongoing and Future (i.e. 𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2, with 
associated test results), giving a difference-in-difference type of measure8 that controls for 
unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may influence selection into being a Chinese 
project site.    
 A potential concern would be if ongoing/future project status picks up project timing and 
projects starting later differ systematically from projects starting earlier. Here it is important to 
note that there is no direct correspondence between when a project was implemented and 
whether it is coded as Ongoing or Future; ongoing/future status depends on project status at 
the time the Afrobarometer survey covered the particular area in question. To illustrate, 
consider Figure A2. In this example, people living in area A, surveyed in 2005, are connected 
to a future project starting in 2007, and people living in area B, surveyed in 2011, are connected 
to an ongoing project that started in 2009. Hence, although the project in area B started two 
years later than the project in area A, it is still the project in area A that is classified as a future 
project, all depending on when the survey covered the areas in question.  
 Furthermore, this type of time variation – with some areas being surveyed earlier and 
others later – exist within as well as across survey waves. Considering the concern that projects 
implemented later may differ systematically from projects implemented earlier, this is 
reassuring. That said, however, there is an over-representation of respondents connected to 
ongoing projects in the later survey waves, why the possible effects of project timing will be 
evaluated in the sensitivity analysis. 
 Using the above approach to study whether Chinese development projects affect local 
ethnic identities, one has to make an assumption about the geographical reach of the potential 
effect. This, in turn, should reasonably depend on how far from project sites citizens are aware 
of the project’s existence and its distribution of rewards. In particular, observing a project being 
implemented without experiencing any of its benefits could – if the perceived unfairness is 
interpreted in ethnic terms – presumably fuel ethnic grievances. As discussed in Knutsen et al. 
                                                        
8 Comparing the difference between post-treatment individuals (with an ongoing Chinese project within 25 km) 
and control individuals (with no Chinese project – ongoing or future – within 25 km) with the difference between 
pre-treatment individuals (with a future Chinese project within 25 km) and control individuals within the same 
country and year (due to country and year fixed effects). 
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(2016), the appropriate cut-off distance from a project – within which an individual will be 
considered ‘treated’ – is an empirical question. I use a 25 km cut-off in the benchmark 
estimation, but results using alternative cut-offs (50 and 75 km) are also presented.  
 
 4 Results 
 
The benchmark results, presented in Column 1 of Table 1, indeed indicate that respondents 
living near an ongoing rather than a future project are more likely to identify in ethnic terms. 
The estimation demonstrates the importance of taking the non-random selection of Chinese 
project sites into account. Looking at the parameter of interest in isolation, the results at first 
sight seem to indicate that, if anything, people living close to an ongoing Chinese project are 
less likely to identify in ethnic terms. As noted, however, interpreting the parameter of the 
Ongoing variable as capturing an effect of Chinese development projects on ethnic identities 
requires that the location of Chinese development projects is not correlated with pre-existing 
ethnic sentiments in these areas.  
 As it turns out, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on future in Column 1 
suggests that Chinese projects tend to be located in areas with lower pre-existing ethnic 
identification. If not accounting for this tendency one would thus underestimate the effect of 
the Chinese presence. The comparison of respondents living in areas with ongoing and future 
projects (βongoing − βfuture) and associated test results are presented in the bottom rows of 
Table 1. The results indicate that those with an ongoing rather than a future project in their 
vicinity are 2.3 percentage points more likely to identify in ethnic terms, statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level. In relation to the overall sample mean of the dependent variable (Table 
A1), the difference is 18 percent and thus quite sizeable. 
  
 4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
 
A similar pattern is observable in a range of alternative specifications (Columns 2-12, Table 
1). Using a wider geographic cut-off – 50 km rather than 25 (see Column 2) – the difference 
seemingly shrinks slightly but is still statistically significant. Considering an even wider radius 
around project sites (75 km, see Column 3) the pattern is similar, but the difference (βongoing −
βfuture) is no longer statistically significant, thus suggesting that the effect fades with distance 
from project sites, as can be expected. Calculating the marginal effects from a probit estimation 
rather than using a LPM (Column 4), the observed difference remains positive but is not quite 
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statistically significant. Using an ordinal variable (ranging from 1-5, increasing in ethnic 
identification) rather than a dummy as dependent (Column 5), thereby capturing the 
individual’s degree of ethnic identification, does not change the interpretation of results.  
 The benchmark specification excludes respondents who live within the cut-off distance of 
a site where a Chinese project has been completed prior to the interview date (approximately 5 
percent of respondents). The argument is that this, through various possible interaction effects, 
may otherwise bias the effect of having an ongoing project nearby, e.g. by inflating ethnic 
identities among supposedly untreated individuals or by interfering with the effect of (post- 
and pre-) treated individuals living close to ongoing or future sites. The estimation in Column 
6, however, instead keeps these individuals in the regression, but includes a dummy variable 
to control for having a completed project within the cut-off distance. The statistically 
significant difference in ethnic identification between individuals living close to ongoing and 
future Chinese project sites remain (the parameter for having a completed project nearby is not 
statistically significant). 
 The benchmark estimation sample is restricted to include only the 18 Afrobarometer 
countries with observations connected to both ongoing and future Chinese development 
projects, i.e. the countries that have both a post- and a pre-treatment group of respondents. The 
estimation presented in Column 7 relaxes this restriction, and includes 8 additional countries 
that only have observations falling into either the post- or pre-treatment category.9 The benefit 
of this is, of course, that the estimated parameters of ongoing and future are based on a larger 
sample. The drawback is the limited common support, or overlap in terms of covariates, this is 
likely to give between respondents connected to ongoing and future Chinese development 
projects. In cases where both post- and pre-treatment groups are not present within the same 
country, one may argue that the conditions of the two groups are too different to allow for 
meaningful comparisons. Nevertheless, we can note that the results based on the larger sample 
are in line with the benchmark results for the more restricted sample.  
 The baseline estimations are based on Afrobarometer data geocoded with precision code 
1-3 (see the discussion in Section 3). The estimation presented in Column 8 instead restricts 
the sample to include only observations geocoded with precision code 1. While preferable in 
                                                        
9 In principle, this means allowing in countries with post-treatment, but no pre-treatment, individuals, namely 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritius, Niger, Sierra Leone and Zambia. None of the sample 
countries have pre-treatment, but not post-treatment, individuals.    
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terms of precision, considering that only 56 percent of the respondents fall into this category, 
this endeavour is arguably problematic in terms of representativeness. Nevertheless, we can 
note that while the estimated parameters of ongoing and future for this sample are of a similar 
magnitude compared to in previous estimations, they are not statistically different from each 
other. 
 The benchmark estimation considers all Chinese development projects (remaining after 
relevant sample restrictions) listed by AidData. As noted, however, China tends to mix 
commercial interests with concessional flows. In order to qualify as overseas development 
assistance (ODA), according to the OECD-DAC definition, an aid flow must be concessional, 
have a grant element of at least 25 percent, and its main objective should be the promotion of 
economic development of developing countries (OECD-DAC glossary, 2016). For 
comparability with Western donors, Column 9 restricts the sample of Chinese projects to 
include only those judged as ‘ODA-like’ by AidData coders (see Strange et al., 2015). The 
results are in line with the benchmark estimation. 
 As discussed in Section 3.1, a potential concern would be if ongoing/future project status 
picks up project timing and projects starting later differ systematically from projects starting 
earlier. Here it is important to note that there is no direct correspondence between time of 
project implementation and ongoing/future project status. A project implemented 
comparatively early may well be coded as a future project, all depending on at what point in 
time the Afrobarometer surveyed that particular area. Furthermore, it is reassuring that this type 
of time variation exist within as well as across Afrobarometer survey waves; all except the last 
individual survey waves contain observations connected to both ongoing and future Chinese 
project sites. That said, however, there is an over-representation of respondents connected to 
ongoing project sites in the later survey waves. And at the time of wave 6, which interviewed 
respondents in 2014 and 2015, all Chinese projects included in the dataset had already been 
initiated, meaning that there are no respondents connected to future project sites in this round. 
Including wave 6 comes with the benefit of a significantly larger sample. However, to explore 
if the lack of pre-treatment observations in this survey round is what drives the results, the 
estimation in Column 10 excludes the observations from wave 6. The results remain 
qualitatively the same.  
 The variables ongoing and future simply indicate if a Chinese project is under 
implementation or will take place in the future in an area. They do not provide any information 
about project duration or of how far into the future the project will start. To limit the variation 
in project duration and time until project start, the estimation in Column 11 focuses only on 
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projects that started (relevant for ongoing) or will start (relevant for future) within five years 
of the interview date. While making the pre- and post-treatment groups smaller, this arguably 
makes them more comparable, limiting the amount of possible changes taking place in the areas 
between the interview date and the implementation date. Again, the key result remains 
unchanged. 
 Another concern would be potential pre-start effects. If the local population receives 
information about a Chinese project ahead of the project implementation period, this could 
presumably fuel ethnic identities prior to project start. If so, the difference between the Ongoing 
and Future parameters would underestimate the effect of the Chinese project on ethnic 
identities. Considering the lack of transparency concerning Chinese development projects such 
anticipation effects would reasonably mainly concern projects starting in the relatively near 
future. To explore whether pre-start effects influence the results, Column 12 excludes 
observations connected to future projects starting within the next year. The estimated difference 
between the Ongoing and Future parameters indeed becomes larger (3.3 percentage points 
compared to 2.3 in the benchmark estimation), seemingly indicating that the effect on ethnic 
identities is to some extent triggered in the immediate period ahead of project implementation. 
Considering the results of Eifert et al. (2010), suggesting stronger ethnic identification as 
elections draw nearer, this is reasonable.  
 In the benchmark setup, country and year fixed effects control for variation in average 
levels of ethnic identities across time and space. However, time trends in ethnic identification 
may well vary across countries, for instance due to where in their electoral cycles the respective 
countries are at the time of the different survey rounds (again, in line with the results of Eifert 
et al., 2010). Column 13, allows for country specific time trends.10 Reassuringly, the results are 
in line with in the benchmark setup.  
 
 4.2 Heterogeneity across in-group and out-group 
 
Above we considered the local effect of Chinese development projects on the ethnic identities 
of citizens in general, making no distinction between people from different ethnic groups. 
Arguably, though, these potential effects are unlikely to be uniform across groups. If the 
allocation and implementation of Chinese development projects involve ethnic bias, from 
which co-ethnics of the country’s president stand to gain, one may suspect ethnic grievances,                                                         10 Interacting the full set of country dummies with the full set of year dummies.  
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arguably fueling ethnic identities, among people belonging to other groups that perhaps do not 
benefit to the same extent. This section assesses whether the effect of living near a Chinese 
development project varies across in-group and out-groups, defined in terms of co-ethnicity 
with the country’s top leadership. 
 In a first step, let us explore whether in-groups and out-groups differ systematically in 
terms of geographic proximity to Chinese development projects. Using the terminology from 
Section 2, is there ethnic bias in geographic allocation of Chinese projects? Dreher et al. (2016) 
found little evidence of ethnic bias in Chinese aid at the regional level, based on estimations 
focusing on ethnographic regions defined in the Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) 
data project of Weidmann et al, (2010). Here we consider project exposure at a more local 
level, running individual level regressions relating proximity to Chinese development project 
sites to self-reported ethnic group affiliations.  
 The results, presented in Table 2, provide some indication that in-groups and out-groups 
differ in terms of geographic proximity to Chinese project sites. Conditional on baseline 
controls, year- and country fixed effects, co-ethnics of the country president are 1.2 percentage 
points more likely than members of other groups to live near a site where a Chinese project 
will be implemented in the future. Moreover, they tend to have a greater number of Chinese 
projects within 25 km. Based on the data at hand, we cannot judge whether this pattern is 
purposeful – it may well be driven by, say, better infrastructure or economic opportunities in 
areas where the in-group is over-represented rather than an intention to favour or discriminate 
certain groups. Moreover, the observed differences are relatively small, and in terms of the 
probability of having an ongoing Chinese projects within 25 km and with regard to the distance 
to nearest Chinese project, co-ethnics of the president do not stand out from members of other 
groups. 
 Importantly, however, measures of geographic proximity to Chinese projects do not 
capture ethnic bias in local implementation and rewards, or perceptions thereof. It may be that 
Chinese projects disproportionately cater to the needs of the in-group. In effect, regardless of 
whether this is true, members of other ethnic groups may perceive that they are excluded from 
the rewards, which may fuel ethnic grievances. Lacking a direct measure of ethnic bias in local 
implementation and rewards of Chinese development projects, what one can do, is consider 
whether the Chinese presence has different effects on the ethnic identities of in-groups and out-
groups in the local area.  
 The estimations in Table 3 include the dummy variable for belonging to the in-group. In 
Column 1, we can note that compared to people from other groups, co-ethnics of the president 
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are around 2 percentage points less likely to identify in ethnic terms, conditional on baseline 
controls. If ethnic grievances fuel ethnic identities, lower ethnic identification in a potentially 
privileged in-group is arguably not surprising. Another interpretation, in line with some recent 
empirical evidence (Green, 2018), is that people are more likely to identify with the broader 
nation-state when a co-ethnic controls the state. The higher ethnic identification among people 
living close to ongoing as compared to future Chinese project sites remains intact.  
 Considering the possibility of perceptions of unfair treatment arising after project start, 
Column 2 introduces an interaction term between the dummy for belonging to the same group 
as the country president and the dummy for living close to ongoing Chinese development 
projects. This allows the effect of living near a Chinese project to vary depending on whether 
the respondent belongs to the in- or out-group. We see that for people not part of the president's 
ethnic group (in-group=0), living near an ongoing as compared to a future Chinese project site 
still comes with a greater tendency to identify in ethnic terms. For members of the in-group, 
on the other hand, this difference is not statistically significant. As discussed in Section 2, this 
finding is in line with the idea that the greater ethnic identification reported among people 
living close to ongoing (as compared to future) Chinese development projects could be driven 
by ethnic grievances originating in perceived ethnic bias. 
  
 4.3 Heterogeneity across sub-samples 
 
The aggregate effect is likely to mask considerable variation across sample countries. The 
African countries in the sample differ considerably, not least with respect to the existence, 
nature and salience of ethnic divisions. The estimations presented in Table 4 explore 
heterogeneity across sub-samples. As it turns out, the estimated effect is by no means uniform 
across different samples.  
 To begin with, one may not expect the observed pattern in countries where ethnic identities 
are not salient. Splitting the 18 sample countries by the average share identifying in ethnic 
terms (Columns 1-2), we can in line with this note that the identified difference in ethnic 
identification between people living near ongoing and future Chinese project sites is only 
present in the nine country-sample where ethnic identities are more common.  
 Similarly, believing that perceptions of ethnic bias contribute to fueling ethnic identities 
near project sites, one may suspect the observed pattern to be more pronounced in countries 
marked by ethnic inequalities. As discussed by Alesina et al. (2016), ethnic inequality is likely 
to generate envy and perceptions that the system is unfair. The estimations in Columns 3 and 
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4 split the sample countries by extent of ethnic inequalities, as measured by Alesina et al. 
(2016).11 The observed difference in ethnic identification is statistically significant in the high 
ethnic inequality sample, but not quite so in the low inequality sample. 
 Furthermore, based on a modernization argument (see e.g. the discussion in Posner, 2004), 
one may suspect ethnic divisions to be more salient (and ethnically biased project 
implementation to be more visible?) in more traditional rural communities than in more 
dynamic urban areas. Whereas rural African communities are often suggested to be tightly knit, 
with ethnic and kinship relations regulating access to resources, urban dwellers are often 
assumed to be more individualistic (see the reasoning in e.g. Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). In 
line with this, the results in Columns 5-6 indicate that the observed difference in ethnic 
identification between people living near ongoing and future Chinese project sites is only 
present in the rural sub-sample. 
 By a similar modernization argument (but focusing on country- rather than urban-rural 
variation), one could argue that populations with better access to the internet and its flow of 
information are less likely to identify in traditional, local and ethnic terms (see e.g. the 
discussion in Kunst, 2014). The estimations in Columns 7-8 split the sample countries by their 
degree of internet penetration (International Telecommunications Union, 2018). The observed 
difference in ethnic identification near Chinese project sites is indeed only present in the low 
internet penetration sub-sample. 
 These sample splits are of course merely speculative. With only 18 sample countries, we 
cannot draw any broader conclusions on systematic country variation in results. The results do, 
however, serve as a reminder that the observed pattern is an average effect, and not uniform 
across sample countries. 
 
 4.4 Comparison with other donors 
 
Chinese development projects seemingly stand out from other influential donors in terms of 
fueling ethnic identities. Replicating the key regressions for World Bank projects (Table 5),12 
                                                        
11 Constructed by comparing night-time light across homelands of ethnolinguistic groups (obtained from the Geo-
Referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) database). 
12 Using data from AidData (World Bank IBRD-IDA, Level 1, Version 1.4.1), covering all World Bank projects 
approved between 1995 and 2014. Again, the sample is limited to include only projects with precise geocodes and 
information about start year, resulting in 688 World Bank projects spread across 6,663 project locations.   
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for which there is also geo-referenced data available for a large multi-country African sample, 
the results do not suggest an equivalent pattern. In fact, they indicate the reverse, i.e. that living 
near an ongoing as opposed to a future project comes with weaker ethnic identification.13 
Moreover, this effect is uniform across in- and out-group, thus providing no indication of 
differential experiences across ethnic groups. A generous interpretation of the weaker ethnic 
identification observed near ongoing World Bank project sites is that ethnically neutral project 
implementation may act to attenuate ethnic identities in these areas. However, a more thorough 
analysis of World Bank projects would clearly be necessary in order to uncover the potential 
mechanisms involved. For the purpose of this study, it suffices to note that Chinese 
development projects stand out from World Bank projects in terms of fueling ethnic identities 
close to project sites. 
 Do the different results obtained for Chinese and World Bank projects simply reflect 
differences in the impact of bilateral and multilateral aid? Indeed, a common argument is that 
bilateral aid is often tied to the political agenda of the donor country and that it is less focused 
on promoting good governance in the recipient country (see the discussion in Charron, 2011). 
It is thus a good idea to compare the effects of Chinese aid projects to those of other bilateral 
donors.  
 For other bilateral donors, geocoded aid project data is available on a large scale only for 
a small selection of African countries. In particular, for Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda and Senegal 
there is geocoded aid data for both China and other donor countries, thus allowing for 
comparison.14 Table 6 presents the results of the equivalent regressions for other bilateral donor 
projects in these countries.  
 Again, the findings suggest a pattern different from that observed for Chinese projects. 
Just as for World Bank projects, the results for other bilateral aid, if anything, indicate that 
living near an ongoing as opposed to a future project comes with weaker ethnic identification. 
Moreover, there is again no indication of parameter heterogeneity across in- and out-group, 
and hence no suggestion of differential experiences across ethnic groups. While these results 
                                                        
13 Restricting the estimation sample to include only countries with observations connected to both ongoing and 
future World Bank development projects results in a sample consisting of 13 of the 18 countries included in the 
benchmark sample for Chinese projects. For comparability, we can note that the benchmark result for Chinese 
projects remains when using this smaller sample. Furthermore, the World Bank result is stable over a wide range 
of specifications (equivalent to those presented in Table 1). 
14 The benchmark result for Chinese projects remains when using this restricted sample. 
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are not very robust across alternative specifications (not presented), probably reflecting the 
limited number of sample countries in focus and the heterogeneity of the donors included, they 
never indicate that having an ongoing project in the local area fuels ethnic identities. In sum, 
we can thus note that Chinese development projects seemingly stand out from other influential 
donors in this respect. 
 
 5 Conclusions 
 
Recent empirical evidence suggest that Chinese aid may be particularly easy to exploit for 
politicians who are engaged in patronage politics. This raises important questions regarding 
potential externalities of aid. In particular, if development finance ends up in the pockets of 
political elites and their ethno-regional networks, does this exacerbate ethnic grievances and 
contribute to ethnic mobilization? The present paper examined whether Chinese development 
projects fuel local ethnic identities in African partner countries. 
 Two mechanisms through which this may occur were proposed. First, competition for the 
inflow of resources that aid constitutes could mobilize ethnic identities across the board. 
Second, perceptions of ethnically biased aid may fuel ethnic identities in disadvantaged groups. 
Against this background, the study asked whether the implementation of Chinese development 
projects fuels ethnic identities near project sites, whether the potential effect is uniform across 
groups, and whether it varies across donors.  
 The empirical analysis drew on a new geo-referenced dataset on the subnational allocation 
of Chinese development finance projects to Africa over the 2000-2014 period, geographically 
matched with 94,954 survey respondents across 18 African countries. To account for the 
endogenous placement of Chinese project sites, focus was on comparing the estimated effect 
of living near a site where a Chinese project was under implementation at the time of the 
interview, to that of living near a site where a Chinese project will appear after the interview 
date.  
 The empirical results indicate substantial country variation, serving as a reminder that the 
African countries in the sample differ considerably in terms of (for instance) the existence, 
nature and salience of ethnic divisions. On average, however, they indeed suggest that living 
near an ongoing Chinese project fuels ethnic identities, thus calling attention to a potentially 
important externality of aid. 
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 Notably, the effect is driven by people who belong to the out-group, i.e. those who are not 
co-ethnics of the country president at the time of the survey. The parameter heterogeneity 
arguably sheds light on the theoretical mechanisms involved; the fact that the effect is only 
present in the out-group may signal that it is driven by ethnic grievances originating in 
perceived ethnic bias rather than ethnic competition for resources more generally. The results 
indeed provide some indication, albeit modest, that members of the in-group are more likely to 
have a (future) Chinese project site in their vicinity. There is thus suggestive evidence of ethnic 
bias in geographic allocation in the sense that Chinese development projects, for whatever 
reason, tend to be located in areas disproportionately populated by the in-group. While we have 
no direct measure of ethnic bias in local implementation and rewards of Chinese development 
projects, the fact that Chinese projects only fuel local ethnic identities among members of the 
out-group may signal perceptions of ethnic bias. 
 Furthermore, if ethnic identities were mobilized by competition for the inflow of resources 
more broadly, rather than perceived ethnic bias in the distribution of these resources, one would 
arguably expect to observe a similar effect across all donors. As it turns out, however, Chinese 
development projects stand out from other influential donors in terms of fueling ethnic 
identities. Hence, this too seemingly speaks against the general ethnic competition mechanism.  
 Replicating the key analysis for World Bank projects as well as for other bilateral donors, 
the results in fact indicate the reverse, i.e. that living near an ongoing as opposed to a future 
project comes with weaker ethnic identification. Moreover, this effect is uniform across in- and 
out-group, thus providing no indication of differential experiences across ethnic groups. While 
a more thorough analysis would be necessary in order to verify these encouraging results across 
a wide range of donors, the suggestive evidence presented here opens for interesting future 
research: can aid projects, if implemented in an ethnically neutral fashion, in effect act to bring 
people together, across ethnic group lines? 
 The results call attention to the importance of considering the distributional consequences 
of aid, and of taking into account between group inequalities when doing so. Since ethnic bias 
could operate at several levels – in geographic allocation, during local implementation and in 
the local distribution of rewards – this requires an awareness of distributional impacts 
throughout the project implementation phase. On a more general level, the paper highlights the 
need to consider not only to what extent aid achieves its explicit objectives, but also its potential 
unintended effects, or externalities. These could be positive or negative and are likely to 
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Figures and tables  
 
Figure 1: Three levels of ethnic bias in the aid delivery process  
 
 
   
30  
Figure 2: Chinese aid project sites and 25 km buffer zones around Afrobarometer survey clusters   
31  
Table 1: Chinese aid and local ethnic identification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) VARIABLES 25 km cutoff 50 km cutoff 75 km cutoff Probit Ordinal dependent Including completed Larger estimation sample Precision  code 1 only ODA Without  wave 6 Within 5 years Excluding next year Future Country specific time trends               
Ongoing -0.008*   -0.010* -0.064** -0.009* -0.008* -0.012** -0.009* -0.012*** -0.004 -0.008 -0.012** 
 (0.005)   (0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (.005) 
Future -0.032***   -0.025*** -0.177*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.024** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.041 -0.031*** 
 (0.011)   (0.010) (0.057) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) 
Ongoing  -0.012***            
  (0.004)            
Future  -0.030***            
  (0.008)            
Ongoing   -0.012***           
   (0.004)           
Future   -0.021***              (0.008)           Diff ongoing-future 0.0234 0.0187 0.00886 0.0800 0.113 0.0233 0.0214 0.0123 0.0226 0.0189 0.0268 0.033 0.019 F test: ongoing-future=0 5.086 5.228 1.327 2.47 3.838 5.024 4.234 1.176 4.548 2.892 4.599 7.43 3.16 p value of F test 0.0242 0.0223 0.249 0.1159 0.0501 0.0250 0.0397 0.278 0.0330 0.0891 0.0320 0.006 0.0757 Observations 90,626 86,541 85,016 90,626 86,962 94,954 107,876 55,546 91,612 65,282 90,626 89,749 90,626 R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.029  0.074 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.035 0.029 0.0294 0.037 Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and country fixed effects; Column 3 presents marginal effects from a probit estimation, the presented difference in difference here refers to the difference between the concerned coefficients, and the test-statistic and associated p-value to a chi2 distribution; In Column 10, ongoing25 and future25 include only projects that started or will start within 5 years of the interview date; Column 12 excludes the observations connected to future projects starting within the next year; Column 13 interacts the full set of country dummies with the full set of year dummies.
32  
Table 2: Chinese project localization: ethnic bias in geographic allocation?  (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Ongoing project  within 25 km Future project  within 25 km Number of projects within 25 km Distance to nearest project      
In-group 0.009 0.012** 0.213** -4.065  (0.011) (0.006) (0.108) (3.813)      Baseline controls YES YES YES YES Year FE YES YES YES YES Country FE YES YES YES YES Observations 94,954 94,954 94,954 94,954 R-squared 0.186 0.122 0.187 0.262 Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 3: Chinese aid and ethnic identification: variation across in- and out-group VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
   
Ongoing -0.008* -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Future -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
In-group -0.019*** -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
In-group*ongoing  -0.017** 
  (0.008)    Diff ongoing-future 0.0225 0.0252 F test: ongoing-future=0 4.693 9.116 p value of F test ongoing-future=0 0.0303 0.00254 Diff (ongoing+In-group_ongoing)-future  .0082 F test (ongoing+ In-group_ongoing)-future=0  0.51 p-value of F test (ongoing+ In-group_ongoing)-future=0  0.4772 Observations 90,626 90,626 R-squared 0.029 0.030 Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and country fixed effects.  
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Table 4: Chinese aid and ethnic identity: Sub-sample heterogeneity  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VARIABLES High ethnic  identity sample Low ethnic  identity sample High ethnic  inequality sample Low ethnic  inequality sample Urban sample Rural sample High internet  sample Low internet sample          
Ongoing -0.010 -0.007 -0.028*** 0.009 -0.016*** 0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) 




   Table 5: World Bank aid and ethnic identity  (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES Ethnic identity Ethnic identity Ethnic identity     
Ongoing -0.013** -0.013** -0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Future 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
In-group  -0.007 0.000   (0.005) (0.009) 














Figure A2: Timeline to illustrate estimation strategy  

























































































Table A1: Summary statistics    
Variable          Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ethnic identity 94.954 0.134 0.340 0 1 
Ethnic ordinal 91.113 2.380 1.193 1 5 
Ongoing25 94.954 0.190 0.392 0 1 
Future25 94.954 0.034 0.181 0 1 
Completed25 94.954 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Ongoing50 94.954 0.296 0.457 0 1 
Future50 94.954 0.060 0.238 0 1 
Completed50 94.954 0.089 0.284 0 1 
Ongoing75 94.954 0.383 0.486 0 1 
Future75 94.954 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Completed75 94.954 0.105 0.306 0 1 
In-group 94.954 0.164 0.370 0 1 
In-group x Ongoing25 94.954 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Age 94.954 36.361 14.405 18 130 
Female 94.954 0.499 0.500 0 1 







Table A2: Variable descriptions  
  
 
Dependent variables, ethnic identification 
Ethnic identification: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports to identify more in ethnic than in national terms, i.e. providing a 
response falling in response category 1 or 2 to the following question (zero otherwise): “Let us suppose that you had to choose 
between being a [national ID] and being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?” 1=I 
feel only [Respondent’s ethnic group], 2=I feel more [Respondent’s ethnic group] than [national ID], 3=I feel equally [national ID] 
and [Respondent’s ethnic group],  4=I feel more [national ID] than [Respondent’s ethnic group] 5=I feel only [national ID], 7=Not 
applicable. 
Ethnic ordinal: Ordinal variable based on the question described above, ranging from 1-5 and rescaled to be increasing in ethnic identification 
 
Proximity to Chinese project sites 
Ongoing25: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 25 km of a site where a Chinese aid project is being implemented at 
the time of the interview, zero otherwise.  
Ongoing50: Same as Ongoing25 but using a 50 km cut-off. 
Ongoing75: Same as Ongoing25 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
Future25: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 25 km of a Chinese projects site where the implementation of the 
project had not yet started at the time of the interview and do not have any ongoing or completed project within this same distance, 
zero otherwise. 
Future50: Same as Future25 but using a 50 km cut-off. 
Future75: Same as Future25 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
Completed25: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 25 km of a completed Chinese project and do not have any 
ongoing project within this same distance, zero otherwise. 
Completed50: Same as Completed25 but using a 50 km cut-off. 
Completed75: Same as Completed 25 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
 
In-group 
In-group: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent belongs to the same ethnic group as the country president at the time of the survey. 
Based on self-reported group affiliation using the question: “What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?”. coupled with 
externally compiled data on the ethnic background of the president at the time of the survey.  For the ethnic groups of president, I 
consult at least two sources for each country, drawing most heavily on the compilation in Dreher et al (2015), when necessary 
updated with more recent data from other sources (e.g. encyclopedia britannica, wikipedia, aljazeera, washington post, 
africareview.com etc. ). 
In-group*Ongoing: A multiplicative term between the in-group dummy and the Ongoing25 dummy. 
 
 
Individual control variables 
Female: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female; zero otherwise. 
Urban: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in an urban area; zero otherwise. 
Age variables: Age in years and age squared. 
 
Year dummies: Dummies for interview year, 2005-2015 
Country dummies: Dummies for the 18 countries in the sample 
      
